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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 282, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. CP-760 
REGIONAL TRANSIT SERVICE, INC., 
Employer. 
CHAMBERLAIN D'AMANDA OPPENHEIMER & GREENFIELD (MATTHEW J. 
FUSCO of counsel), for Petitioner 
HARRIS BEACH, LLP (PETER J. SPINELLI & MELISSA A. FINGAR of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Regional Transit Service, Inc. 
(RTS) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) placing the title of Farebox 
Technician1 in a unit of RTS employees represented by the Amalgamated Transit 
Union, Local 282 (Union), pursuant to a unit placement petition filed by the Union. The 
ALJ determined that the Farebox Technicians shared a community of interest with unit 
employees, rejecting RTS's argument that at least one of the Farebox Technicians has 
sufficient supervisory authority to make placement in the unit inappropriate. 
) 
1
 Farebox Techncians are also known as Collection System Repair Persons. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
RTS excepts to the ALJ's decision primarily on factual grounds, arguing that the 
ALJ misread and incorrectly characterized the testimony, thus erring by basing her 
decision on the wrong facts. The Union supports the ALJ's decision, arguing that the 
record supports her factual findings and conclusions of law. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are summarized here 
only as necessary for this decision.2 We find no reason, based upon our review of the 
record, to disturb the ALJ's credibility resolutions and factual findings.3 
The Union represents a unit of approximately 400 employees, including 300 bus 
drivers and 100 maintenance employees. The bus drivers perform the duties normally 
associated with bus drivers, but they do not collect fares; fares are deposited directly by 
passengers into the farebox. The maintenance employees both maintain and repair 
buses and maintain RTS's physical plant. Employees within the unit also install the 
fareboxes in the buses. 
2Regional Transit Service, Inc., 35 PERB 1(4010 (2002). 
3An ALJ's credibility resolutions are entitled to great weight based upon 
substantial evidence. See State of New York(PEF), 33 PERB P046 (2000), confirmed 
sub nom. Benson v. Cuevas, 272 AD2d 764 (3d Dep't 2000), 35 PERB U7008 (2002), 
motion for leave to appeal denied, 95 NY2d 760 (2000); State of New York-Unified 
Court System, 28 PERB H3004 (1995). 
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The Farebox Technicians also do not handle any money directly. In concert with 
employees of a private security contractor, once a day, they transfer money from RTS's 
vault to the contractor's secure container.4 While the Farebox Technicians are bonded, 
they have no responsibilities for accounting for receipts, counting money or taking 
custody of RTS's cash or receipts. They do not act as security guards for RTS, as the 
employees of the private contractor provide that service. 
The primary function of the Farebox Technicians is to repair fareboxes and trim 
units, either on the bus or in their office, located next to the shop where unit employees 
overhaul bus transmissions and engines. Other unit employees work on RTS's buses, 
repairing heating and air conditioning systems. 
The three Farebox Technicians - Ronald Sabernick, Jr., Agostino Ranieri and 
Keith Freeman - work as a team, dividing the work of their shop. They report directly to 
the Vice President of Operations for RTS, Paul Holahan. Sabernick is the most senior 
employee and is at the highest pay grade of the three, grade eleven.5 Ranieri's salary is 
similar to the Technician II title in the bargaining unit. Sabernick does not assign work, 
approve overtime, schedule vacations or evaluate Ranieri or Freeman. The Farebox 
Technicians maintain their own vacation board, as do other unit employees, within the 
same or similar job classifications. Supervisors have their own vacation board and 
Sabernick is not included in that group. 
4The Farebox Technicians utilize an Authority forklift for this function. They also 
use the forklift to transfer large items to storage. The forklift is also operated by 
buildings and grounds maintenance personnel in the performance of their duties. 
5Grade eleven is the same salary grade as supervisors. 
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DISCUSSION 
RTS argues that the ALJ did not consider the testimony of the witnesses as a 
whole and only highlighted the testimony that supported her ultimate conclusion. The 
ALJ's decision sets forth the facts in detail, discussing the testimony of each witness as 
relevant to the issues before her. That she accepted the facts as testified to by the 
Union's witnesses and made credibility resolutions in favor of those does not mean that 
she did not consider the evidence presented by RTS, only that she did not find it 
dispositive of the unit placement of the Farebox Technicians. As noted, infra, RTS has 
pointed to examples in the transcript that it contends contradict the ALJ's factual 
conclusions. However, our review of the record shows that the ALJ's factual findings 
are correct, there is no reason to disturb her credibility resolutions and, to the extent 
that there are factual errors, they do not compel disturbing the ultimate disposition of 
the case by the ALJ.6 
RTS argues that because the title of Farebox Technician is excluded from the 
recognition clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement, that the title may not 
be placed in the unit represented by the Union. As noted by the ALJ, we rejected this 
argument in County of Rockland,7 where we held that: 
Although public employers and employee organizations are 
encouraged to agree upon the composition of bargaining 
units, as well as the terms and conditions of employment of 
unit employees, when a representation dispute arises, PERB 
has the statutory duty, pursuant to §207 of the Act, to 
6See Monroe Community College (Case), 29 PERB 1J3008 (1996). See also 
Cayuga-Onondaga BOCES, 32 PERB 1J3079 (1999). 
728 PERB H3063, at 3143 (1995). 
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determine the most appropriate bargaining unit consistent 
with the criteria contained therein. Agreements between the 
employer and the employee organization regarding unit 
inclusions and exclusions are, accordingly, not controlling. 
(Citing to State of New York, 1 PERB |f399.85 (1968)). 
A unit placement petition is, in substance and effect, a mini-representation 
proceeding calling only for a nonadversarial investigation and the application of the 
statutory uniting criteria in §207.1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).8 
We, therefore, consider this case in the context of our decisions determining whether a 
community of interest, or the potential for a conflict of interest, exists between the 
petitioned-for employees and the employees in the bargaining unit. We have long held 
that the most appropriate unit is the largest that permits for effective and meaningful 
negotiations. As long as there is no potential or actual conflict, employees who have 
different occupations and terms and conditions of employment may be grouped 
together if they share a general community of interest. 
RTS argues that the Farebox Technicians have an inherent conflict of interest 
with members of the bargaining unit based upon their duties and the disparity in salary 
between the Farebox Technicians and the employees represented by the Union. Within 
any large unit comprised of employees in various titles, there are potential conflicts of 
interest based upon the diverse duties performed, the training and skill required to 
perform job duties specific to a certain title and the location of the work performed. As 
noted by the ALJ, the Farebox Technicians work in the same facility as many of the 
mechanics and technicians in the bargaining unit. There is some interplay 
General Brown Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1(3065 (1995). 
Board - CP-760 -6 
between the Farebox Technicians and other unit employees. For example, cleaners in 
the unit report that a farebox needs to be repaired, other employees are responsible for 
drilling holes for installation of the farebox and the Farebox Technicians, as well as unit 
employees, utilize the forklift in the performance of their duties. 
That there is a disparity in salary between the Farebox Technicians themselves, 
and between them and others in the bargaining unit, does not warrant dismissing the 
petition.9 There is a community of interest between the employees in the at-issue titles 
and others in the bargaining unit represented by the Union in that they share a joint 
responsibility to ensure that RTS's buses are running in proper order, including the 
proper receipt of fares from passengers. 
RTS also argues that the Farebox Technicians are guards and should not be 
placed in the bargaining unit with other, non-security titles, consistent with the policies 
and decisions of the National Labor Relations Board. Even were we to conclude that 
the Farebox Technicians, because they are bonded, have some responsibilities in the 
transfer of RTS's receipts and have had to review receipts in one instance when theft 
by a bus driver was suspected, are security personnel, we would not find that to be a 
sufficient basis, in and of itself, to exclude them from the Union's bargaining unit.10 Even 
though, as argued by RTS, if they were guards, they would be entitled to a separate 
bargaining unit under the National Labor Relations Act, a separate unit under the Act 
^C^rthana C^nt S/~h /"I/of 1 f i P P R R f lAH^c; aff'H 1R P F R R *TCnB^ C\C\fr-X\ 
10See Lindenhurst Union Free Sch. Dist, 25 PERB fl4038 (1992), affd, 26 PERB 
H3017 (1993). See also Town of Brookhaven, 33 PERB 1J4035 (2000); North port-East 
Northport Union Free Sch. Dist, 33 PERB U4014 (2000); Seaford Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 31 PERB 1J4002 (1998). 
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would only be warranted if there were a demonstrated conflict of interest.11 We do not 
find, on this record, evidence of such a conflict of interest. 
Finally, RTS argues that Sabernick should be excluded from any bargaining unit 
because he is a supervisor. We have previously held: 
There is no prohibition against mixed units of supervisors 
and rank-and file employees. . . . It is the nature and level of 
supervisory functions which have always determined 
whether a mixed unit of supervisors and subordinates is 
most appropriate or a unit of supervisors separate from the 
rank-and-file is most appropriate.12 
Here, at best, Sabernick, given his seniority, may guide the work of the other 
Farebox Technicians. He has been called upon from time to time to offer input and to fill 
in for an absent supervisor. There is, however, no record evidence that he does 
anything more than make recommendations to his co-workers about their work and, on 
occasion, to his superiors, who are the decision-makers. Such responsibilities do not 
warrant his exclusion from the bargaining unit.13 
We find, therefore, that the Farebox Technicians share a sufficient community of 
interest with employees in the Union's bargaining unit to warrant placement in that unit. 
11We have removed employees from a bargaining unit because of their 
performance of a full range of law enforcement functions. See County of Erie and 
Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB fl3031 (1996) (fragmenting deputy sheriffs from an 
existing unit that included correction officers and civilian personnel); County of 
Rockland, 32 PERB fl3074 (1999) (fragmenting investigative and narcotics aides 
working as undercover narcotics agents for the County's District Attorney's Office from 
an inclusive unit of County employees). 
^County of Genesee, 29 PERB 1J3068, at 3159 (1996). 
13See County of Steuben, 34 PERB fi3023 (2001). 
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Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions of RTS and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
Accordingly, the petition is granted and the title of Farebox Technician is hereby 
placed in the unit represented by the Union. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
y~v 
(J ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM T. BRUNS, 
; Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-13349 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO AND 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF PAROLE), 
Respondents. 
KATHLEEN C. BRUNS, for Charging Party 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARIA B. MORRIS of 
counsel), for Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for State of New York (Division of Parole) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William T. Bruns to a decision of 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge he filed 
alleging that the State of New York (Division of Parole) (State) and Council 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) violated, respectively, §§209-a.1(a) and (c) and §209-
a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by entering into an 
agreement at arbitration, which settled a grievance Bruns had fiied concerning his ciaim 
to overtime pay. 
) Bruns' charge had been limited by the hearing ALJ to three allegations: 
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1. The settlement agreement between the State and Council 82 regarding 
Bruns' claim for overtime pay; 
2. The failure of Council 82 to process Bruns' grievance regarding payment 
of a uniform allowance in a timely manner as required under the collective 
bargaining agreement; 
3. The failure of Council 82 to process Bruns' grievance for longevity pay. 
At the subsequent hearing in this matter, Bruns withdrew the allegations that his 
uniform allowance grievance had not been processed in a timely manner and that his 
longevity pay grievance had not been processed. At the close of Bruns' direct case, 
both Council 82 and the State moved to dismiss the remaining aspect of the charge for 
failure to present a prima facie case. The ALJ reserved judgment on the motions and 
then closed the record. 
In his decision, the ALJ confirmed his earlier ruling limiting the charge to the 
three allegations.1 The decision then dealt with the only remaining issue open at the 
close of Bruns' case: the agreement entered into at arbitration by the State and Council 
82 in settlement of Bruns' overtime grievance. Giving Bruns every reasonable inference 
to be drawn from the evidence and testimony made part of the record during Bruns' 
direct case, the ALJ found that there was no evidence of any improper motivation on 
the part of the State in entering into, the agreement in settlement of Bruns' grievance 
and that there was no evidence of any disparate treatment of Bruns in the settlement of 
his grievance. 
As to Council 82, the ALJ determined that it had not breached its duty affair 
representation to Bruns in its processing of his grievance and in reaching the settlement 
agreement with the State. 
135 PERB H4538 (2002). 
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Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
This charge has been twice before us on interlocutory appeals from interim 
rulings of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) or an ALJ and it has been the basis of rulings in other improper 
practice charges filed by Bruns relating to the at-issue allegations. In 1993, Bruns 
requested that the processing of this charge be held in abeyance pending a decision in 
an earlier charge he had filed (U-12252). We denied his interlocutory appeal of the 
Assistant Director's determination that the instant matter would not be held pending the 
outcome of Bruns' other litigation.2 Despite our earlier decision, the matter was 
apparently thereafter put on hold pending our determination in U-12252.3 In the interim, 
we dismissed an additional improper practice charge filed by Bruns (U-14203), noting: 
Other allegations relating to the handling of his Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) overtime claim by Council 82's 
retained counsel are the basis of his charge in Case No. 
U-13349. As these claims are the basis of improper practice 
2State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Council 82, AFSCME, 26 PERB j[3028 
(1993). 
3State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Security and Law Enforcement, Council 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 27 PERB 1J3016, at 3040-41 (1994), where we noted, at n.13, 
that: 
...Bruns filed an improper practice charge on March 23, 
1992 (Case No. U-13349) alleging that the State and 
Council 82 had improperly settled this overtime grievance 
and all related claims at an arbitration held on February 19, 
1992. That stipulation of settlement provides that Bruns 
receive $4,878.28 as final payment for all compensable 
hours worked by him in 1988 and specifically references the 
monies paid and later disallowed by Parole on December 
19, 1990. Case No. U-13349 is being held pending the 
decision in this case. 
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charges already before PERB, they too must be dismissed, 
(footnote omitted) The propriety of Council 82's actions in 
these respects will be adjudicated in the context of the 
already pending charges. A second charge premised on the 
same grounds is unnecessary and inappropriate.4 
Finally, we denied Bruns' interlocutory appeal of the ALJ's decision to limit the 
hearing on the instant charge to the three allegations set forth, supra.5 
The Assistant Director's initial determination that this charge would not be held in 
abeyance pending the processing of U-12252 is not before us and we, therefore, do not 
reach it. However, Bruns has excepted to the ALJ's determination that the hearing 
would be limited to the three allegations set forth, supra. We hereby deny Bruns' 
exceptions to the ALJ's rulings in that regard. The other allegations set forth in Bruns' 
amended improper practice charge, received May 15,1992, allege contract violations 
by the State or violations by both the State and Council 82 of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA), a federal statute, over which PERB has no jurisdiction. As to the allegations 
in the improper practice charge relating to the handling of Bruns' FLSA claim by Council 
82's attorney and the deduction by the State of $2,692.29 from Bruns for overpayment 
of overtime, those incidents occurred well before four months prior to the filing of the 
instant charge and are, therefore, untimely.6 
Bruns further argues, essentially, that our decision in U-14203 was a directive 
that all the allegations in the instant charge were to be heard by the ALJ. Our decision 
in U-14203 merely indicated that the duplicative allegations in U-14203 would be 
4State of New York {GOER) and Council 82, AFSCMCE, AFL-CIO, 26 PERB 
1f3058, at 3102 (1993). 
5Council 82, AFSCME and State of New York (GOER and Div. of Parole and Div. 
of Budget), 32 PERB'P040 (1999). 
6Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1 (a)(1). 
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dismissed because they would be "adjudicated in the context" of U-13349. We made no 
finding as the merit of those allegations nor did we make a finding as to the procedural 
aspects of the processing of U-13349, we only determined that the allegations that 
were made first in U-13349 would be decided in that case. Bruns has no right under the 
Act or the Rules to repeat allegations in subsequent improper practice charges to seek 
different or additional rulings.7 Our decision in U-14203 provides Bruns with no 
guarantees as to the ultimate treatment of his numerous allegations, only that each 
allegation would be considered and addressed in the processing of the charge, even if 
the conclusion reached by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director), Assistant Director or assigned ALJ is that certain allegations 
are beyond our jurisdiction, are untimely or are without merit. 
Bruns' remaining procedural exceptions deal with rulings made by the ALJ, both 
declining to issue some of the subpoenas requested by Bruns prior to the hearing and 
by refusing to accept into evidence certain documents offered by Bruns at the hearing. 
Bruns argues that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witnesses to be 
subpoenaed was relevant to his case. We find no basis in the record to disturb the 
ALJ's declination to issue the requested subpoenas. Bruns also argues that he has 
been held to a higher standard of relevant evidence than is warranted by our Rules or 
by the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable to 
our proceedings. While we do not require compliance with the technical rules of 
evidence in our proceedings,8 we rely upon New York precedent to answer questions 
7Local 589, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters (AFL-CIO), 15 PERB1J4568, afTd on other 
grounds, 15 PERB 1J3116 (1982), (subsequent case history omitted). 
Rules, §212.3(e). 
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with respect to evidence. Bruns argues that the several exhibits declined to be accepted 
into evidence by the ALJ either on relevance or foundation grounds were improperly 
excluded. Even though the technical rules of evidence do not apply to our proceedings, 
we do hold the parties to the accepted standard for relevance.9 Administrative 
decisions must be based upon substantial evidence,10 which, in New York, is evidence 
which is both relevant and probative.11 Our review of the record provides no basis to 
reverse the ALJ's rulings as to the documents in issue. 
Council 82 argues that Bruns' exceptions to the ALJ's decision do not meet the 
requirements of §213.2(b) of the Rules in that there are no references to the transcript 
and that the exceptions are replete with conclusory statements. Our Rules require 
specificity in the filing of exceptions to facilitate our review of the arguments made in the 
exceptions, and to ensure that exceptions are supported by factual references to the 
transcript or exhibits or to legal precedents. We will consider the exceptions filed by 
Bruns to the extent that review of the voluminous record without page reference is 
possible and to the extent that Federal case law, which forms the legal basis of most of 
Bruns' legal arguments, is relevant and applicable to decisions issued by this Board.12 It 
is not our responsibility, nor the responsibility of the other parties to this action, to 
9That which is logically probative of some matter to be proved is relevant. Fisch 
nn New York F\/itienr.e S3 at n 3 CFrlith I Fisr.h eH 2nd ed 9377^ 
™300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc, v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176 (1978); 
Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 NY 256 (1940). 
11
 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 US 197 (1938 ); Matter of 
Ralph v. Board of Estimate of the City of New York et al, 306 NY 447 (1954). 
12See City of New Rochelle, 18 PERB P021 (1985). 
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ascertain what, if any, record basis exists for Bruns' arguments, when Bruns has made 
his references to the record general, conclusory and without page number. 
Finally, both the State and Council 82 argue in their responses to Bruns' 
exceptions that Bruns has attempted to introduce new evidence and raise new 
arguments in the exceptions, which this Board may not consider. We will not consider 
the new evidence offered byl3runs as part~oTtl^exceptions71"3 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision and are repeated 
here only as they relate to the exceptions filed by Bruns. 
Bruns is a Warrant and Transfer Officer (WTO) employed by the State in the 
Division of Parole (Parole). He transports parole violators and prisoners both within 
New York and from other states. At all times relevant to this charge, Bruns was a 
member of the unit represented by Council 82. 
Effective July 27, 1986, WTO's became eligible for payment of retroactive and 
prospective overtime compensation as a result of the State's compliance with the 
FLSA. Bruns submitted his overtime claims but thereafter filed a grievance on March 2, 
1989, alleging that he had not been paid overtime owed him for the period July 7, 1988 
through October 26, 1988.14 Parole informed Bruns and Council 82 on April 24, 1989, 
13See, Smithtown Fire Dist, 28 PERB fl3060 (1995); Town of Greece, 26 PERB 
T|3004 (1993); Civil Service Employees Ass'n, inc. and State of New York (Rockiand 
Psychiatric Center), (Reese), 25 PERB P012 (1992); Manhasset Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 24 PERB fl3003 (1991); Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB 1J7018 
(3d Dep't 1987), appeal dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). 
14Bruns filed an additional overtime grievance and, subsequently, Council 82 also 
filed a grievance on Bruns' behalf relating to overtime compensation for the period July 
7, 1988 through December 31, 1988. See State of New York (Div. of Parole) and 
Security and Law Enforcement, Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 27 PERB TJ3016 
(1994). 
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that the Office of the State Comptroller (OSC), had suspended payment of all WTO 
overtime claims pending a review by the OSC Management Audit staff. All claims had 
to be certified and, with the assistance of Council 82's attorney, some of Bruns' claims 
were paid. 
Eventually, the grievance seeking the payment of the balance of the overtime 
compensation that Bruns claimed was scheduled for arbitratioh7l5Xouncir82,s attorney 
represented Bruns and Council 82 at the arbitration hearing. After several days of 
hearing and the presentation of Bruns' case, the State made a settlement offer to 
Council 82. The terms of the settlement were payment of the entire number of hours in 
dispute, but did not include interest, liquidated damages and attorney's fees, which 
Bruns had insisted upon. The arbitrator advised the State and Council 82 that he did 
not believe he had the authority to award liquidated damages and attorney fees and 
that if he ordered interest, it would not be for the period prior to September 1990. Over 
Bruns' objection, Council 82 signed the settlement agreement. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ correctly stated the standard which must be applied when ruling on a 
motion to dismiss at the close of a charging party's case. The ALJ "must assume the 
truth of all of charging party's evidence and give the charging party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those assumed facts."16 
The proof required in a §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) case is that the charging party 
establish that he or she was engaged in a protected activity, the employer knew of the 
protected activity and that the complained of employer's action would not have been 
15The grievance concerned overtime worked by Bruns from July 7, 1988 through 
December 31, 1988, including 101 hours of overtime initially disallowed by the State 
and 127.5 hours of overtime retroactively disallowed and offset by the State. At issue 
was also 18.5 hours of overtime that Bruns had adjusted at the State's direction. 
16
'County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB fl3013, at 3030 (1984). 
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taken but for the exercise of protected rights by the charging party.17 The proof required 
in a duty of fair representation case, alleging a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act, is 
that the union's actions were deliberately invidious, arbitrary or taken in bad faith.18 
The ALJ determined that, giving Bruns every reasonable inference to be drawn 
from the record before him, the actions of the State and Council 82 in reaching a 
sefflemenTof the grievance of Bruns'^vertime claims didTio^n/iolale^th^ActrWe^agree. 
There is no evidence that the State settled the grievance for any improper 
reason or that its proposed settlement agreement discriminated against Bruns or 
treated him in a disparate manner from other, similarly situated, WTOs. The attorney 
who represented the State at the arbitration had no previous involvement with Bruns 
and there is no evidence that anyone from Parole was involved in initiating the 
settlement. Additionally, an action taken by an employer to resolve or minimize the 
impact of a grievance, absent improper motivation, does not violate the Act.19 
As to Council 82, "[o]ur decisions have always recognized that a union is and 
must be afforded a wide range of reasonableness in making decisions associated with 
the processing of a grievance, including how far it will proceed with a particular 
grievance or case (citation omitted)."20 We have been "loath to substitute our judgment 
for that of an employee organization" in determining the strategy to be used in an 
arbitration hearing or the decision to settle a grievance at any step of the contractual 
nState of New York, 33 PERB 1f3046 (2000). 
18C/V// Service Employees Ass'n Local 1000 v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 
20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), afTd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 
(1988). 
™State of New York (Dep't ofSoc. Serv.), 26 PERB 1J3035 (1993); Savona Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 20 PERB 1J3055 (1987). 
^Transport Workers Union of Greater New York and NYCTA (Amaker), 32 PERB 
H3004, at 3009 (1999). 
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grievance procedure.21 Absent evidence that the action taken by the union is arbitrary, 
discriminatory or taken in bad faith, no breach of the duty will be found. 
The evidence in the record establishes only that Bruns was dissatisfied with 
Council 82's presentation of his case at arbitration and with the terms of the agreement 
that ultimately settled his grievance. Dissatisfaction with the union's handling of a 
grievance does not establish a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act.22 Even were we to 
conclude, as urged by Bruns, that Council 82 made errors in its calculations of the 
amount owed to Bruns when it agreed with the figures offered by the State, such an 
error would constitute, at best, mere negligence. Disagreement with the tactics utilized 
or dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of representation does not constitute a 
breach of the representation duty. Even negligence or an error in judgment does not 
establish such a violation.23 The other numerous, self-aggrandizing, and, at times, 
circuitous arguments and allegations made in Bruns' exceptions are beyond the scope 
of the improper practice charge as processed. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we deny the exceptions filed by Bruns and affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Public Employees Federation (Levy), 33 PERB p 0 6 1 , at 3179-80 (2000). 
Local 1635, District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 25 PERB 1J3008 (1992). 
!Civil Service Employees'Ass'n (Kandel), 13 PERB P049 (1980). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
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Marc A. Afcbou. Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on an exception filed by the Police Benevolent 
Association of New York State Troopers, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper practice charge on a motion to dismiss at the 
close of its case. The charge alleged inter alia, that the State of New York (Division of 
State Police) (State) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the interpretation of "probation" as used in 
disciplinary settlements. According to the PBA, the State's interpretation may result in a 
trooper's termination from employment without a hearing. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's decision, alleging that the ALJ erred by requiring 
the PBA to show a change in a prior practice in order to sustain its burden of proof. 
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The State responded that the ALJ's decision was correct. We agree. 
FACTS 
The facts, based upon the parties' stipulated record, are fully set forth in the 
ALJ's decision.1 We will review only the facts relevant to the PBA's exceptions. 
The improper practice charge alleged that State police officers who complete 
their probationary period achieve a property right in their employment which cannot be 
taken away without a hearing. Furthermore, under Rule 3 of the Rules and Regulations 
of the Division of State Police (Division), officers who obtain the permanent rank of 
trooper, sergeant, lieutenant and major have the right to a due process hearing. The 
charge further alleges that: 
[l]t has been a long-standing practice that members who achieve 
permanent employment status and accept Division level probation 
as a penalty do not waive the rights and protections afforded under 
Executive Law §215(3) and Rule 3, including but not limited to, their 
right to a hearing. 
The State submitted an answer which generally denied the material allegations 
of the charge and interposed certain defenses, including an averment that there had 
been no change in a term or condition of employment. 
A hearing was held on March 7, 2002,2 at which time the parties stipulated to the 
documents to be included in the record. The PBAthen rested without calling any 
witnesses, and relied upon the documentary record in evidence. The State then moved 
to dismiss the PBA's charge on the ground that the PBA failed to prove a prima facie 
case. The ALJ reserved and adjourned the hearing in order to permit the parties to 
135 PERB H4546 (2002). 
2The ALJ that noted the passage of time between the filing of the charge and the 
hearing resulted from the parties' attempt to resolve the dispute. 
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brief the motion. Thereafter, the ALJ granted the State's motion and dismissed the 
charge. 
The PBA alleges in its exceptions that the ALJ erred when he determined that it 
failed to meet its burden of proof when it did not establish a change in a prior practice. 
The PBA argues that, where no prior practice existed, its burden is met by establishing 
the new practice together with proof that the new practice is itself a mandatory subject 
of bargaining. We disagree. 
The standard of proof with which to judge the merits of a motion to dismiss is 
long established.3 The question thus presented is whether the evidence produced by 
the charging party, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is 
sufficient in the absence of rebuttal evidence. Our recent decision in State of New York 
(PEFf dealt with a similar situation in which the charging party stipulated to the 
documentary record before the ALJ and rested without calling any witnesses. The 
State moved to dismiss the charge at the close of the charging party's case. The ALJ 
granted the State's motion to dismiss based upon the charging party's failure to prove a 
change in practice. We held that the charging party has the burden, in an improper 
practice charge alleging a change in past practice, to demonstrate by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a change in a work rule has occurred, not merely to establish the 
current practice. 
2County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
433 PERB fl3024 (2000), conf'd sub nom, Benson v. Cuevas et al, 288 AD2d 542 
(3d Dep't 2001). See also County of Dutchess, 32 PERB 1J3047, conf'd sub nom. Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuevas etal, 
21A AD2d 930, 33 PERB 1J7012 (3d Dep't, 2000); Town ofRamapo, 33 PERB J3021 
(2000). 
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We note that among the documents made part of the stipulated record is a letter 
dated June 3, 1999, to the PBA's counsel from the State Police Office of Counsel that 
unequivocably set forth the position of the State: 
This letter reiterates the long standing position that the Division of 
State Police can, and will, in the appropriate case terminate the 
employment of a member who has agreed to be restored to 
probation tosatisfya-personnel complaint—-—. 
The PBA attorney responded on June 17, 1999 controverting the position taken 
by the Division. Since the PBA has alleged a change in practice,5 it must, therefore, 
demonstrate the conditions that existed prior to the implementation of the alleged 
change. It must be established that the practice was unequivocal, had been in 
existence for a significant period of time, and that unit employees could reasonably 
expect such practice to continue.6 Under the "best evidence rule", this is a question of 
fact which exists independent of the stipulated documents from counsel.7 However, the 
stipulated record in this case was devoid of any evidence that demonstrated the 
working conditions that existed prior to the implementation of the alleged new work rule. 
The record, up to the point at which the motion to dismiss was made, merely 
contained the self-serving declarations made by PBA's counsel which is not material to 
the inquiry. The alleged practice was still in dispute at the close of the PBA's direct 
case as evidenced by the letter from Division's counsel made a part of the stipulated 
record. 
5ALJ Exhibit #1. 
6See County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 (1991). 
1
 Richardson on Evidence, §572, at p. 581-582 (Jerome Prince, ed., 10th ed. 
1973). 
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Since we are constrained by our precedents to consider only the charging party's 
direct case when a motion to dismiss has been made,8 we must dismiss the charge on 
the record before us. The PBA pled certain affirmative facts which it failed to prove in 
its direct case through the use of independent evidence, and which were controverted 
by the State.9 
Based upon the foregoing, we hereby deny the PBA's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
* Marc A. Abbott, Member 
&County of Nassau (Police Dep't), supra, note 3. 
9See CityofYonkers, 10 PERB fi3020 (1977). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Mark L. Nagy, M.D., to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his improper practice charge, which, 
as amended, alleged that the State of New York (State University of New York at 
Buffalo) (State) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it terminated him from his position as Clinical Assistant 
Professor of Otolaryngology at the State University of New York at Buffalo School of 
Medicine and Biomedical Sciences (SUNYAB) because of his exercise of protected 
rights.1 
1Nagy's charge also contained allegations that United University Professions, 
Inc. (UUP), which represents a unit of professional university employees of the State, 
violated §209-a.2(c) of the Act by failing to represent him regarding his termination from 
employment. Those allegations were later withdrawn by Nagy. 
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At the hearing in this matter, after Nagy had rested, the State made a motion to 
dismiss the charge, arguing that Nagy failed to establish that he was a public employee 
within the meaning of the Act, that he failed to establish that he had been engaged in 
protected activity and that he failed to establish that, but for his protected activities, his 
appointment toLibeLfacultyLwould haveJxeen renewed-JIheALJ closed the record and 
accepted briefs from both parties on the State's motion. 
In deciding the motion, the ALJ did not address Nagy's public employee status, 
but, giving Nagy the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the 
evidence he presented,2 he found that Nagy had not established a nexus between the 
filing of his grievance and his non-renewal. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Nagy excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the record establishes that the 
decision to not renew his appointment was improperly motivated. The State supports 
the ALJ's decision.3 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of Nagy's improper practice charge, but on 
different grounds. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in. the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only 
as relevant to the issues before us. 
2County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
3The State reserved the right to cross-except to the ALJ's determination that, for 
the purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss, Nagy is a public employee, if the Board 
should reverse the ALJ's dismissal for failure to prove a prima facie case. 
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Nagy was appointed on July 1, 1997, to an unsalaried, full-time position as 
Clinical Assistant Professor in the Department of Otolaryngology at SUNYAB. 
SUNYAB, through its Board of Trustees, has promulgated certain policies which 
constitute rules of the Trustees for the government of the SUNY. The Trustees 
developed a plan under which clinical practice income was to be managed, which is set 
forth in Article XVI of the policies.4 As a faculty member at SUNYAB, Nagy was obliged 
to participate in the plan under the terms of Article XVI. Nagy's sole compensation was 
from the clinical practice group in which he participated. He has never received a 
salary from SUNYAB and he has never paid dues or agency fees to UUP. 
In April 1998, Nagy was advised by SUNYAB that he and others in his group 
were not in compliance with the plan. Nagy opposed the requirement of continued 
participation in the plan as a protest to what he saw as inequities in the plan. In October 
1998, Nagy withdrew from the plan. SUNYAB then changed his faculty status from 
unsalaried, geographic full-time faculty to volunteer, informing Nagy that, as he was no 
longer participating in the plan, he was no longer a faculty member. UUP thereafter filed 
a grievance on behalf of Nagy and other salaried physicians.5 
Nagy was reinstated to his unsalaried, geographic full-time faculty position in 
June 1999, based upon SUNYAB's presumption that Nagy was now in compliance with 
the plan. Nagy thereafter decided not to participate in the plan. He was informed on 
4
 See State of New York (State University of New York-SUNYat Buffalo) (Egan), 
35 PERB1J3019 (June 12, 2002), in which the practice plans are discussed in detail. 
5The grievance was denied at step 1 based upon a determination that, since the 
doctors had been reinstated, the issue was moot. 
Board - U-22042 -4 
June 16, 2000, that he would not be renewed because of his noncompliance with the 
plan requirements. 
DISCUSSION 
Consistent with our decision in County of Nassau (Police Department), supra, 
the ALXdecided the_mo.tiarj_to_d.ismis.sJxy-giving Nagyline-benefit ofLevery reasonable 
inference that could be drawn from the evidence in the record at the close of his case. 
He assumed for the purposes of his decision, that Nagy was a public employee within 
the meaning of §2017(a) of the Act. 
The Act applies to "public employees," who are defined to include . . . any 
person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public 
employer... .6 Our jurisdiction is limited to cases involving public employees.7 Thus, 
the ALJ should have considered Nagy's employment status first so as to determine 
whether PERB has jurisdiction over the instant charge. 
This Board has not had the opportunity to address this particular issue before. 
The Act defines "public employee" generally, with no reference to compensation. But 
the Act "provides a working definition, not an exact equation, for ascertaining who is a 
'public employee'. In deciding whether particular persons or classes of individuals are 
6Act, §201.7(a). See also City of New York v. District Council 37, AFSCME et al, 
33 PERB 1J7503 (Sup. Ct. New York County 2000). 
7A/.Y. Public Library v. PERB et al, 45 AD2d 271, affd 37 NY2d 752 (1975); New 
York Institute for the Education of the Blind v. Fed of Teachers' et al, 83 AD2d 390, affd 
57 NY2d 982 (1982) (subsequent history omitted). 
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encompassed within the definition, traditional concepts of employee status deserve 
consideration as do the realities of the working relationship."8 
Traditional concepts of employment recognize that the receipt of compensation, 
in some form, is required in defining a person as an "employee".9 In an Opinion of 
Counsel,^it was determined that unpaid memb_em^^ ^ 
public employees within the meaning of the Act because they did not receive 
compensation from the municipality, even though they worked a mandated number of 
hours per day, passed required training and received uniforms from the municipality. 
Several years later the rationale articulated by PERB's Counsel was adopted by 
the Office of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York (OCB) and confirmed by 
Supreme Court, New York County, in a case where the court affirmed OCB's 
determination that unsalaried podiatry residents were not "public employees" within its 
jurisdiction.11 We agree and here hold that Nagy is not a public employee within the 
meaning of the Act.12 
aState of New York (Dep't ofCorr. Sen/.), 5 PERB H4040, at 4070 (1972), aff'd 6 
PERB 1J3033 (1973), confd, Prisoners' Labor Union at Bedford Hills v. PERB, 44 AD2d 
707, 7 PERB 117006 (2d Dep't 1974), motion for leave to appeal denied, 35 NY2d 641 
(1974). 
9See Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) which defines employee as "one who 
works for an employer; a person working for salary or wages." See also Gen. Mun. L, 
§682 which defines "public employee" as "any person directly employed and 
compensated by a government...." 
108 PERB H5009(1975). 
"New York City Office of Collective Bargaining, 13 PERB H7522 (Sup. Ct. New 
York County 1980). 
12That Nagy sought a salary from the State, in addition to the compensation he 
received from the plan, and that there were efforts on the part of both SUNYAB and 
UUP to obtain State compensation for him is not dispositive. His appointment was to an 
unsalaried position and it is to that position that he lays claim in this matter. He has 
never received compensation from the State. 
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As Nagy is not a public employee, we cannot exercise jurisdiction over this 
improper practice charge. We, therefore, do not reach the merits of his improper 
practice charge or the ALJ's decision on the merits. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Nagy's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's 
-dismissaLof the charge, but on the_g.r_o_und.s set forth^sup/'a.W.e grant the Staters 
motion to dismiss the charge for lack of jurisdiction. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
-6 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
l^v^U^^yJ^r 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the Westhampton Beach Police 
Benevolent Association (Association) and the cross-exceptions of the Incorporated 
Village of Westhampton Beach (Village) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) dismissing the improper practice charge filed by the Association, which alleged 
that the Village had violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it abolished the position of lieutenant held by David Doyle 
and demoted him to sergeant because of the exercise of protected rights. 
The ALJ dismissed the charge on a finding that, while Doyle was engaged in 
protected activities and the Village was aware of his activities, the Village had taken the 
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complained of action for legitimate business reasons and not because of anti-union 
animus. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in finding that Doyle's 
objection to the change in his duties was not a protected activity within the meaning of 
the Act, in limiting the proof of protected activities to those allegedly engaged in by 
Doyle prior to the issuance of the memorandum of the chief of police to the Village 
Board of Trustees (Village Board) recommending the abolition of the lieutenant's 
position and Doyle's demotion to sergeant, and in finding that the reasons advanced by 
the Village were not pre-textual. 
The Village cross-excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in 
finding that Doyle was engaged in any protected activity prior to the date of the chief's 
memorandum. The Village's response otherwise supports the decision of the ALJ. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, but on different grounds. 
FACTS 
Doyle was a lieutenant on the Village's police force from 1994 to November 13, 
2000, at which time, pursuant to a resolution of the Village Board, the lieutenant 
position was abolished and Doyle was demoted to sergeant, with a concomitant 
reduction in salary. Both the lieutenant and sergeant titles are within the bargaining unit 
represented by the Association. Doyle was Association vice-president in 1987, the only 
office he has held in that organization. 
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Raymond Dean became a sergeant in the Village's Police Department on April 6, 
1999, having transferred from the police force of the Town of Southampton. By Village 
Board resolution dated May 6, 1999, Dean was appointed acting provisional chief of 
police upon the retirement of the prior police chief. On November 8, 1999, Dean was 
provisionallyLappointed acting policechiefLand, on December's, 1999, he became 
chief of police. 
Doyle had protested Dean's transfer to the department to the prior chief of 
police, but there is no evidence that Doyle's protest was made known to either Dean, 
the Mayor or the Village Board. Shortly after his appointment as provisional acting chief 
of police, Dean appointed two Village police officers to sergeant in May 1999 and 
assigned to them some duties previously performed by Doyle, despite Doyle's 
complaints to Dean about the reassignment of his duties. 
In July 1999, Doyle wrote Dean a department memorandum advising him of what 
he believed was an error in purchasing a police vehicle with blue, as well as red, 
emergency lights, expressing his opinion that such lights on a police vehicle were not 
permitted by the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Dean recalled a conversation with Doyle 
about the lights, but not receiving a memorandum. 
After Dean's appointment as provisional chief of police in November 1999, Doyle 
spoke with the Mayor and protested the scheduling of a promotional test for chief of 
police which excluded Doyle. The Mayor told him he was not qualified for the position, 
although Doyle testified that the Mayor also told him that he was not liked by the Village 
Board and that if he continued to push, consideration would be given to abolishing the 
lieutenant's position. Doyle apparently spoke with officials of the Association before and 
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after his conversation with the Mayor. The Association did not accompany him to his 
meeting and did not take any action, save the filing of the instant charge, after the 
meeting. 
In July 2000, an interest arbitration award was issued, setting the terms of the 
Village-Association contract for the years 1998 through 2002, the term of the award 
having been agreed upon by the parties. The interest arbitration award, inter alia, 
lowered the starting salary of unit employees, granted a salary increase, gave the 
Village the right to set a new duty chart with eight-hour shifts instead of ten-hour shifts 
and a squad system. In response to the arbitration award, Dean was asked by the 
Village Board to review the department and make recommendations as to how the cost 
of the award could be borne by the Village and how the shift and scheduling changes 
could be accomplished. 
On July 19, 2000, Dean sent a memorandum to the Mayor, recommending that 
the new duty chart commence on October 1, 2000, that three additional police officers 
be hired, and that the number of sergeants be increased from three to five. Dean also 
recommended that the position of lieutenant be abolished and Doyle be demoted to 
sergeant. Dean explained that Doyle was effectively performing the duties of a road 
sergeant and had no management responsibilities. He further opined that the money 
saved in salary could be applied to the costs of the arbitration award and, furthermore, 
that two other sergeants had complained that the lieutenant was performing the duties 
of sergeant at a higher salary. 
Doyle was called back to duty from a vacation day on September 17, 2000. He 
filed a grievance on September 21, 2000. Doyle's grievance, and five others, were 
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thereafter resolved by the Association and the Village. Doyle was credited for the day. 
In October 2000, Doyle sent Dean a memorandum regarding the staffing for the 
Halloween parade, pointing out what he believed were safety concerns raised by the 
manner in which Dean staffed the parade. 
On November 13, 2000, the Village Board passed a resolution abolishing the 
.position of lieutenant and returning Doyle to the sergeant's position, with a loss of 
$6800 in salary. Doyle testified that both Dean and the Mayor told him his position was 
abolished due to fiscal concerns. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ correctly noted that the proof required to establish a violation of §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act is that the charging party was engaged in a protected activity, 
the employer was aware of the protected activity and that the employer acted because 
of those activities and without legitimate business reasons for its action.1 
The ALJ found that Doyle was engaged in protected activities and that Dean was 
aware of his activities, but dismissed the charge on a finding that Dean and the Village 
acted pursuant to legitimate business reasons. The ALJ found that the operative date of 
the Village's action was Dean's memorandum of July 19, 2000, recommending that the 
lieutenant position be abolished and that Doyle be demoted to sergeant. The evidence 
shows that although the Village Board did not act until November 13, 2000, its action in 
abolishing the lieutenant position and demoting Doyle was based solely on Dean's 
1See, State of New York (State Univ. of New York at Buffalo), 33 PERB 1J3020 
(2000); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB tf3012 (1985). 
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memorandum. The ALJ, therefore, considered only those activities that occurred prior 
to the date of Dean's memorandum. 
Of the activities during that time frame - Doyle's conversation with the prior chief 
protesting Dean's transfer to the department, Doyle's memorandum to Dean about the 
blue lights on the new police car and Doyle's meeting with the Mayor, complaining 
about there being no open competitive examination for the position of chief of police -
the ALJ found all to be protected within the meaning of the Act. He found, however, that 
Dean was only aware of the problem Doyle had with the police car lights and that Dean 
had not recommended the abolition of the lieutenant's position because of Doyle's 
memorandum. 
The Act affords certain rights and protections to public employees. These are 
specified in §§202 and 203 of the Act and comprise the right of employees to organize, 
and to be represented in the negotiation of agreements and the administration of 
grievances arising thereunder. Violation of these rights by public employers constitutes 
violations of §§209-a.1(a), (b) and (c) of the Act.2 Actions taken by an employee 
individually that are not prompted or encouraged by the employee organization or which 
are not taken pursuant to established employee organization policy or the collective 
bargaining agreement, do not constitute activity protected by the Act.3 
The three actions under consideration here were all undertaken by Doyle 
individually. He is not an elected or appointed representative of the Association and he 
2Board ofEduc. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York and United Fed'n of 
Teachers, 19 PERB fi3006 (1986). 
3Metropolitan Suburban BusAuth., 23 PERB P006 (1990). 
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did not represent himself as such in any of these incidents. He did not represent that he 
was speaking on behalf of the Association or the unit members, nor was he 
accompanied by any representatives of the Association. His memorandum regarding 
the police car lights was addressed to Dean as chief and Doyle only identified himself 
as lieutenant, with no referenC e j0 jn e^s s o c jatLon 
The ALJ found each of these actions to be protected activities on Doyle's part. 
He points to the collective bargaining agreement and a department practice of having 
employees communicate safety concerns to their direct supervisor and found that 
Doyle's complaint about the police lights was the reporting of a safety concern, in 
furtherance of an Association policy and the practice between the parties. The ALJ's 
reliance on Village of New Paltz? is, however, misplaced. There, the employee identified 
himself as a union shop steward, although he was not, and represented that his safety 
complaints were being made on behalf of his union. That activity, taken for and on 
behalf of an employee organization, is clearly protected by the Act. Doyle's complaint, 
however, is, and appears to be, an individual employee's complaint about a potential 
safety and liability issue. To the extent that Doyle testified that there was an established 
department practice which required employees to report safety concerns to their direct 
supervisors that arose from the labor-management committee provisions in the 
collective bargaining agreement, the ALJ found, pursuant to Metropolitan Suburban Bus 
Authority, supra, that the activity was protected. We disagree. 
425PERB 1J3032 (1992). 
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As was the case with the employee in Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority, 
supra, Doyle was making an individual complaint pursuant to what he perceived his 
duty as lieutenant to be, not pursuant to any specific contract language or directive from 
the Association. Therefore, we do not find that his report was an exercise of a right 
protected by the Act and reverse the ALJ's decision to the extent that he found 
otherwise. 
As this was the only activity of Doyle's within the relevant time period that was 
known by Dean and, as the ALJ properly found, because Dean's recommendation to 
abolish the lieutenant's position and demote Doyle was not motivated by Dean's 
concerns about Doyle's police car light concerns, our inquiry ends here. The other two 
actions engaged in by Doyle were never made known to Dean, who wrote the 
.) 
memorandum in-issue, that was accepted by the Village Board in July 2000, and which 
formed the sole basis for its November 2000 resolution abolishing the lieutenant's 
position and demoting Doyle. 
Further, the two actions were once again actions taken by Doyle as an 
individual. That other police officers complained, individually, to the former chief of 
police about Dean's transfer does not transform Doyle's complaint into a concerted 
activity protected by the Act. Likewise, Doyle's complaint to the Mayor about the 
examination for the chief of police was an individual complaint.5 His reiteration of the 
5We do not find that Doyle's conversation with the Association prior to speaking 
to the Mayor, wherein he asked the Association's permission to speak to the Mayor 
individually about the examination, converted an individual action into one that was 
taken on behalf of the Association. The ALJ's reliance on County of Westchester, 32 
PERB 1J3018 (1999) (subsequent history omitted), is misplaced. While holding a union 
office is not required to come within the Act's protection, there the employee was 
identified by the employer as being a union representative or at least actively involved 
in union matters, and the employee held himself out as a union representative or 
activist. 
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complaint to the Association does not compel a finding that the complaint itself was 
undertaken on the Association's behalf or at its direction or that Doyle was acting as an 
authorized representative of the Association when he complained to the Mayor. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny the Association's exceptions and grant 
theJ i^llageAs exceptions.JWeuaffirm the^ALXs dismissal of the charge^b 
finding that Doyle was not engaged in protected activities during the relevant time 
frame. We also affirm the ALJ's finding that the Village's action was based upon 
legitimate business reasons. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Ivlarc A. Abbott, Member 
Jomn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-22413 
TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL BAMBERGER 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
LAURY L. DOWD, DEPUTY TOWN ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of North Hempstead 
(Town) to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision that found that the Town 
violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it transferred the president of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) bargaining unit from his in-house title of Director of Permit 
Division to his civil service title of Building Inspector II. 
The Town alleged in its answer that there was a legitimate business reason for 
the transfer and raised, as an affirmative defense, that Section XV of the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement permitted its action. 
) Board - U-22413 -2 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Town excepts from each and every part of the ALJ's decision on the law and 
the facts. More specifically, the Town excepts from that part of the decision that found 
the transfer interfered with the unit president's use of union release time and that the 
I own h^Tiefth^rle^itlmate^rJusiness reasons nor a colorable contractualTiglTt to 
transfer the unit president. 
CSEA filed cross-exceptions to that part of the ALJ's decision finding that the 
unit president's transfer was not motivated by anti-union animus. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
) FACTS 
Daniel LoMonte has been employed by the Town since 1982, with only a brief 
interruption in 1992. He has been in the civil service title of Building Inspector II since 
about 1995 or 1996. He also held the in-house title of Permit Division Director since 
about 1995 or 1996. LoMonte has been unit president of CSEA since July 1998. 
Pursuant to the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, he is entitled to 
two days per week leave for union business.-
David Wasserman became the Town's Commissioner of Buildings in May 2000. 
Subsequent to his appointment, he spent the next few months gaining an 
understanding of the internal operation of the department. He testified that he felt that 
17Joint Exhibit #1, Section XVI(f), Miscellaneous. 
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the most immediate need was to increase the pace within which permits could be 
reviewed and issued,- even though the department faced significant physical and 
financial constraints. During this time period, he was developing the department's 
budget for the next calendar year. This included staffing and the potential of bringing 
into^th^Tlel^TtmeTTt acid itionalTW 
testified that it soon became evident to him that the "bottle neck" in the flow of work in 
the Permit Division of his department was in the examination of plans. The department 
had one full-time examiner, a part-time examiner and the Director, LoMonte. LoMonte's 
time was split between his director duties and "whatever activities he might otherwise 
be involved with. That was understood."-
In the Fall of 2000, Wasserman planned a reorganization of the department 
which had an impact on the Permit and Inspection Divisions. The reorganization took 
place on January 2, 2001- and involved the transfer of LoMonte from the Permit 
Division to a filled position in the Inspection Division. Wasserman testified that it was 
his intention to use LoMonte's experience with construction inspection to make up for 
the impending manpower shortage in the Inspection Division because of a pending 
retirement and the departure of an inspector.-
-Transcript, p. 150. 
-Transcript, pp. 151-152. 
*ALJ Exhibit #1. 
-Transcript, p. 153. 
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Wasserman also testified that, prior to the reorganization, there were occasions 
when LoMonte was out of the office and Wasserman, who needed to speak with him 
regarding pending permit applications, was unable to reach him by phone.-' 
Subsequent to the reorganization, LoMonte carried a cell phone and could be reached 
while~performing1:hedutiesofabuilding inspector-
On February 21, 2001, CSEA filed its improper practice charge alleging, inter 
alia, that the Town violationed §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act when Wasserman 
transferred LoMonte to the Inspection Division on January 2, 2001. The Town generally 
denied the allegations and asserted as an affirmative defense that Section XV of the 
collective bargaining agreement provides the Town with the authority to transfer 
employees to new assignments. 
DISCUSSION 
Although CSEA argues in its charge that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) 
of the Act, the ALJ found "that CSEA failed to demonstrate that Wasserman or any 
other Town representative acted upon union animus, that is, with a specific intent to 
harm the union or LoMonte because of his union involvement." We agree that no 
animus on the part of Wasserman is established on this record.-
§/Transcript, pp. 182-183. 
-The Town moved to dismiss the charge at the close of CSEA's direct case. The ALJ 
denied the motion at the hearing. Since the Town took no exception to this ruling, we 
need not address this issue. 
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However, even though the ALJ found no anti-union animus, she found that 
LoMonte's transfer violated the Act. The ALJ determined that, because LoMonte would 
not have been transferred "but for" his use of union release time - a protected activity -
the Town violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, even without any evidence of anti-
unionranimxrs7~lt isrwithrthts^conclusion that we disagree: 
We reaffirmed in State of New York (SUNY-Oswego)-1 that, with regard to cases 
involving interference and/or discrimination, the burden of persuasion lies with the 
charging party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the public 
employer acted with improper motivation. The existence of improper motivation and/or 
anti-union animus may be established by statements or by circumstantial evidence, 
which may be rebutted by the presentation of legitimate business reasons for the action 
taken, unless found to be pretextual.— In State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services),— we held also that: 
It is possible for an employee's discharge to violate §209-
a.1 (a) or (c) of the Act, even if the actors responsible for the 
discharge bear no union animus, either generally or 
specifically. An animus finding is essentially evidentiary. A 
finding of animus helps to establish the requisite causation. 
On the other hand, the absence of animus can help to 
negate an inference or finding that an action was motivated 
improperly by the employee's exercise of statutorily 
protected rights. 
^34 PERB 1J3017 (2001). 
— See also Cayuga-Onondaga Board of Cooperative Educational Services (Hoey), 32 
PERB 1J3079 (1999). 
^'25 PERB 1J3050, at 3106 (1992). 
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Our inquiry must, therefore, include an analysis of the Town's stated reasons for 
transferring LoMonte. 
In State of New York (Unified Court System),— we reiterated that there is no 
^fetutcryTightto u^ ^ 
necessarily derives from a negotiated contractual provision or non-contractual practice 
However, once such a provision is negotiated into a collective bargaining agreement, an 
employer's interference with, or discriminatory treatment because of, an employee's 
choice to exercise such a union release provision violates §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the 
Act, unless there is a corresponding contractual right being exercised by the employer-
or the employer is acting pursuant to a legitimate business purpose.— 
Here, the ALJ found no evidence of anti-union animus and rejected the business 
reasons proffered by the Town in support of its decision to transfer LoMonte. 
We find that the Town offered legitimate business reasons for its transfer of 
LoMonte to the Inspection Division. That the ALJ articulated other potential solutions to 
Wasserman's perceived need to more fully staff the Permit Division and address the 
needs of the Inspection Division, does not warrant the conclusion reached by the ALJ 
that the decision to transfer LoMonte was motivated solely by his use of union release 
^26 PERB H3046(1993) 
— "A corresponding contract right necessarily involves the same subject matter as the 
contract right at issue in a charge." Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3070, at 
3166(1999). 
^'County of Nassau, 27 PERB 1(3011 (1994). 
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time. In the absence of anti-union animus, the review of the articulated business 
reasons offered by an employer in support of a management decision does not include 
the substitution of an ALJ's judgment for the judgment of the employer. That an ALJ 
may have addressed an employment issue in a different way than it was addressed by 
theremployeT does~not render the^employerVstated legitimate business reasons 
"pretextual" unless the articulated reasons are so lacking in merit as to define "pretext". 
The Act does not insulate union officers of any type or at any level from the 
adverse effects of an employer's properly motivated managerial decisions.— The Act 
ensures only that employees are not interfered with, discriminated against or improperly 
advantaged in their employment relationship because of their decisions with respect to 
union membership, office or participation.— 
We find that LoMonte was transferred to the Inspection Division because of the 
legitimate business reasons articulated by Wasserman both to LoMonte and on the 
record and largely unrebutted by CSEA. Given the absence of any anti-union animus on 
the part of Wasserman and the Town, and Wasserman's several concerns regarding 
the staffing and operation of both the Permit and Inspection divisions in light of the 
Town's fiscal situation, we find that LoMonte's transfer was not violative of §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act.' 
— See State of New York (Unified Court System), supra, note 12. 
— See, County of Nassau, supra, note 14. 
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Based upon our review of the record, we deny CSEA's exceptions and reverse 
the decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
, < : 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Charging Partyi 
- and - CASE NO. U-22541 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
COLLERAN, O'HARA & MILLS (DENIS A. ENGEL of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (CAROLINE LAGUERRE-
BROWN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York City Transit 
Authority (NYCTA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found that 
the NYCTA violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally assigned Level I (SSI) supervisors to zone supervision. The Transit 
Supervisors Organization (TSO), which filed the improper practice charge, filed cross-
exceptions. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The NYCTA's exceptions relate generally to the ALJ's decision on the law and 
the facts and, more specifically, to the ALJ's finding that the NYCTA unilaterally 
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assigned nonunit SSI supervisors to the task of zone supervision, a task performed by 
Level II (SSIl) supervisors. 
The TSO's cross-exceptions relate to the ALJ's factual determination that the 
proof failed to establish exclusivity over booth audits and investigations conducted by 
SSI supervisors 
FACTS 
The ALJ's findings of fact are set forth in her decision1 and we will review the 
salient facts in the record only insofar as they relate to the exceptions. 
A letter dated July 18, 2001, to the conference ALJ outlined the three work duties 
in contention: 
1. Exercising supervisory responsibility over employees working at groups of 
one or more subway stations or "zones"; 
2. Conducting revenue or "booth" audits in station booths manned by station 
clerks located at subway stations throughout the subway system; and 
3. Conducting investigations of operational/mechanical problems with 
subway turnstiles and gates and of passenger accidents. 
The ALJ noted in the factual exposition of her decision that the TSO's sole 
witness was Arlene Brown, a long-tenured employee with the NYCTA and currently a 
SSIl supervisor. Brown testified that a reorganization of the supervisors took place in 
1985. She was, at that time, promoted from SSI supervisor to SSIl supervisor and 
assigned to supervise a zone. She testified on direct examination that". . . there were 
135 PERB fl4526 (2002). 
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other instances in the past year where Level One Supervisors had been given jobs with 
responsibility for coverage of zones of stations."2 
When asked by the ALJ whether there had been instances beyond six months 
when SSIs were sent out to perform the work of SSIIs; she replied in the affirmative.3 
Brown fixed a-timepriorJo 2000in-response_to-theALJls question_abouLwhen_SSLs 
would be sent to resolve reported problems.4 At the conclusion of Brown's testimony, 
TSO rested its direct case. NYCTA moved that the ALJ dismiss the charge upon the 
ground that TSO failed to adduce facts sufficient to prove a violation of §209-a.1 (d) of 
the Act. The ALJ reserved on the motion and NYCTA presented its case.5 
Charles Glasgow, Director of Labor Relations for the NYCTA, testified, however, 
that SSIs have been performing the same functions since the 1985 reorganization. 
Vivian Campbell, a New York Station Transit Division Superintendent, corroborated his 
testimony that supervision of employees has always been shared by SSIs and SSIIs. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ summarily disposed of two preliminary issues prior to deciding the 
merits of TSO's case; to wit, timeliness and collateral estoppel. 
2Transcript, p. 17. 
3Transcript, p. 28. 
4Transcript, pp. 28-29. 
5TSO failed to take exception to the ALJ ruling on this issue. Therefore, 
pursuant to §213.6(b) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules), a review of this issue will not 
be dealt with on this appeal. 
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On the issue of timeliness, NYCTA did not raise the defense in its answer to the 
improper practice charge. Rather, it raised timeliness by way of a written motion to 
amend the answer verified on November 26, 2001. This was subsequent to the hearing 
on November 21, 2001 and prior to receipt of the transcript on December 1, 2001. By 
letter dated DecemberJ1,2001^_theALJ informed the parties that NYCTA motion had 
been denied.6 
In addition, TSO argues in favor of "judicial estoppel" on the basis that because 
NYCTA received a favorable result in an earlier litigation involving the SSIs and SSI Is,7 
it is now precluded from making contrary factual assertions. The ALJ correctly noted 
that the aforesaid case was dismissed on the threshold finding of untimeliness and no 
substantive findings were made. Therefore, the doctrine of judicial estoppel would be 
inapplicable.8 
NYCTA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in her findings with regard to 
the assignment of SSIs. NYCTA also argues that the ALJ's order is based upon errors 
of law and fact. TSO argues in its cross-exceptions that Brown's testimony was clear 
6NYCTA failed to take exception to the ALJ's denial of its motion to dismiss on 
timeliness. Consequently, as no exceptions have been taken to that aspect of the 
ALJ's decision, the issue is not before the Board on appeal. We make no finding as to 
timeliness. State of New York (Office of Mental Health), 31 PERB1J3051 (1998); see 
also Rules, §213.2(b)(4), which provides that an exception which is not specifically 
urged is waived. 
1
 NYCTA, 26 PERB 1J4595, aff'd, 26 PERB 1J3081 (1993). 
8TSO failed to take exception to the ALJ ruling on these issues it raised. They 
will not be dealt with on this appeal. 
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and concise and that TSO met its burden of proof on the issue of exclusivity over both 
audits and mechanical investigations by SSIIs. 
The ALJ decided these factual questions based upon well-established case law 
that requires TSO to demonstrate that the supervisory work at issue has been 
performed exclusivelyLby_unit employees and that the tasks reassignedJo nonunit 
employees are substantially similar to the unit work.9 Thus, the ALJ's focus was on 
whether the supervisory work at issue was done exclusively by the SSIIs. 
Based upon this record, we find that the ALJ erred in determining that zone 
supervision had been performed exclusively by the SSIIs and we, accordingly, must 
reverse that part of the decision. 
The ALJ correctly found no exclusivity in any of the three areas referred to in the 
July 18, 2001 letter. However, she contradicted herself on the issue of "zone" 
supervision. On the one hand, she concluded that "the evidence compels me to 
conclude that both SSIs and SSIIs perform supervisory functions with respect to 
employees and that such has been the case since the 1985 reorganization." On the 
other hand, she also concluded that the additional element of the assignment of SSIs to 
zone supervision violated the Act because zone supervision is exclusive to SSIIs. We 
disagree. 
The ALJ failed to support her finding in favor of the SSIs on the issue of zone 
supervision. She merely states that "all witnesses have acknowledged that such duty 
'See County of Onondaga, 24 PERB 1J3014 (1991), cont'd, 187 AD2d 1014, 25 
PERB 1J7015 (4th Dep't 1992), motion for leave to appeal denied, 81 NY2d 706, 26 
PERB 1T7003 (1993). See also Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB 1J3083 (1985). 
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has been exclusive to the SSIIs . . . . " The ALJ did not sufficiently evaluate the 
testimony of TSO's sole witness, Brown. Brown's testimony on the issue of zone 
supervision was ambiguous, at best. When asked by TSO counsel whether supervision 
of zones was an exclusive level SSIIs responsibility, she replied "[B]asically, yes." 
When-asked further^whetherJhere came a time last year^(2000) thaLSS-S_had been 
given positions or responsibility for supervising zones or stations, she replied "Yes."10 
Brown's description of zone supervision incorporated duties performed by SSI 
supervisors as well.11 
More importantly, TSO failed to introduce any evidence indicating that NYCTA 
specifically assigned SSIIs and SSIs to specific geographical areas or zones. TSO 
introduced into the record an excerpt of the NYCTA Rules and Regulations entitled 
"Supervisor (Stations)."12 Rule 166 sets forth duties and responsibilities of SSIs and 
SSIIs in general terms. TSO would have us construe these regulations strictly when, in 
fact, these are merely representative of typical assignments within a class. The 
regulation also explains that "[A]ll personnel perform related work and such other duties 
as the New York City Transit Authority is authorized by law to prescribe in its 
regulations." 
Further, the two witnesses called by NYCTA, Glasgow and Campbell, offered 
unrebutted testimony as to the sharing of supervisory responsibilities by the two titles. 
10Transcript, p. 16. 
11Transcript, p. 15. 
12Charging Party Exhibit 4. 
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As Glasgow testified, the SSII title was created to groom supervisory employees to take 
on managerial responsibilities.13 In that regard, the record demonstrates an overlap of 
duties performed by SSIs and SSIIs. This was also illustrated by TSO's witness, 
Brown, who testified that, in the absence of an SSII, she would assign an SSI.14 
We do not find,j3n this re^^^ 
of the at-issue duties. We, therefore, grant the NYCTA's exceptions, deny the TSO's 
cross-exceptions, and reverse the decision of the ALJ on the issue of zone supervision. 
The remainder of the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge, must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
; DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
13Transcript, p. 34. 
14Transcript, p. 26. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
and CASE^NQ^C-5Q45 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Law Enforcement Officers 
Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be 
appropriate and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5045 page 2 
Included: Traffic and Park Officer, Park Patrol Officer, Environmental 
Conservation Investigator I and II, Environmental Conservation 
Officer, Environmental Conservation Officer Trainee I and II, 
Supervising Environmental Conservation Officer, University Police 
Officer I and II, University Police Investigator I and II, and Forest 
Ranger I and II. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER/IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A: Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 791, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
GREECE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
GREECE SUPPORT SERVICES EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, NEA/NY, 
CASE NO. C-5159 
Intervenor. 
) CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 791 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described beiow, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
J grievances. 
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Included: Non-instructional unit consisting of regularly employed non-
instructional personnel in the following departments: the 
Transportation Department, including substitutes therein; the 
Buildings and Grounds Department, including Custodial; the Food 
Service Department; the Business Office; the Personnel Services 
Office; the Instructional Services Office, the Information Services 
Department; Central Stores; Print Shop; the Community Services 
Office; and Continuing Education Office. 
Excluded: District Administrators, Supervisors of Support Staff, substitutes, 
and also high school custodial foreman, Supervisor of Central 
Stores, Transportation Assistant, and Secretary of Support 
Services Director. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 791. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5200 
TOWN OF VESTAL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER f O NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5200 page 2 
Included: All regular full and part-time employees who work in the 
Department of Fire, Engineering, Code, Police, Tax Collector, 
Assessor, Court, Business, Town Clerk, Supervisor, Water and 
Recreation. 
Excluded: Department heads, elected officials, police officers, seasonal 
employees, library employees, operating engineers, employees 
who work less than 300 hours in a calendar year, Senior Account 
Clerk-Payroll, Confidential Appointment to the Town Supervisor, 
Secretary to the Town Attorney, Assistant Water Superintendent, 
Deputy Highway Superintendent, and part-time Mechanic. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5215 
SOUTHERN WESTCHESTER BOARD OF 
COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5215 Page2 
Included: All classified staff titles, including the following: Account Clerk, 
Account Clerk/Typist, Account Clerk/Typist (senior), Accountant, 
Accountant Jr., Adaptive Equipment Specialist, Administrative 
Assistant, Administrative Assistant Jr., Assistant Supervisor of 
Transportation, Auto Mechanic Foreman, Bus Dispatcher, 
Clerk/Transportation Office, Clerk Spanish Speaking, Community 
Aide, Community Aide (10 mos.), Community Aide (Spanish), 
Community Worker, Computer Aide, Control Operation Supervisor-
Office Management, Cook-Manager (10 mos.), Cued Speech 
Interpreter, Data Entry Operator, Departmental Aide, Duplicating 
Machine Operator, Film Inspector, Food Service Helper (10 mos.), 
Head Bus Driver, Head Custodial Worker, Health Claims 
Processor, Interscholastic Athletic Assistant, Inventory Control 
Clerk, Job Coach/Bus Driver, Job Development Specialist, Library 
Assistant, Licensed Practical Nurse, Off Asst-Automated Systems, 
Off Line Equipment Operator, Office Assistant, Office Asst-
Automated Systems Sp Sp, Office Asst ll/Staff Attendance, Parent 
Trainer (10 mos.), Payroll Clerk, Personnel Assistant, Prof. 
Development Specialist, Purchasing Assistant, Regional 
Certification Assistant, Registered Professional Nurse, Safety & 
Security Officer, Scheduler/Assigning Coordinator, School Monitor 
(10 mos.)-NC, Senior Account Clerk, Senior Clerk, Sign Lang Inter 
INC (10 mos.), Sign Lang Inter IIC (10 mos.), Sign Lang Inter II (10 
mos.), Sign Lang Inter (10 mos.), Sports Desk Asst. (12 mos.), Sr. 
Job Development Specialist, Sr. Office Assistant, Sr. Office 
Asst/Auto Systems, Sr. Payroll Clerk, Sr. Typist, Sr. Typist (10 
mos.), Staff Asst-Automated Systems, Staff Asst-RIC, 
Stenographer, Systems Control Clerk-Off Mgmt, Telephone 
Operator, Telephone Operator-PT, Translator (10 mos.), Typist, 
Word Processing Operator. 
Excluded: Secretary to Chief School Official, Secretary to School Official, 
Assistant Business Manager, Executive Secretary/Typist. 
All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
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other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 19, 2002 
Albany, New York 
//IMichael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ / 
i/ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
